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Herman Knudsen* 
European Works Councils – Potentials and Obstacles on the 
Road to Employee Influence in Multinational Companies** 
 
Abstract – The theme addressed by this article is the opportunities for European Works 
Councils (EWCs) of gaining influence on corporate decisions in multinational companies 
(MNCs). The first part introduces the European Union Directive on European Works Coun-
cils as well as debated themes and previous research on EWCs; further it discusses the concept 
of supranational employee influence as distinct from employee influence at plant and national 
level. In the second part of the article findings from Danish research on EWCs are presented 
and analyzed; the focus is on employee influence and factors inhibiting employee influence. 
The research is based on surveys among Danish EWC representatives as well as among man-
agers in Danish based MNCs. It is found that the level of employee influence through EWCs 
is relatively low. Attempting to explain this the article further identifies a number of factors 
tending to inhibit the formulation and articulation of employee interests at the supranational, 
European level. In the concluding part of the article the findings are summed up and their 
relevance for EWCs in general are discussed. 
 
Europäische Betriebsräte – Potentiale und Hindernisse auf dem Weg 
zur Arbeiternehmerbeteiligung in multinationalen Unternehmen 
Zusammenfassung – Das in diesem Beitrag behandelte Thema sind die Chancen für Europä-
ische Betriebsräte (EBR), Einfluss auf korporative Entscheidungen in multinationalen Unter-
nehmen (MNU) zu nehmen. Im ersten Teil werden neben der Direktive Richtlinie über EBR 
die relevanten Themen früherer Debatten und Untersuchungen über die EBR vorgestellt, des 
weiteren das Konzept des supranationalen Einflusses, im Vergleich zu dem auf betrieblicher 
und nationaler Ebene, diskutiert. Der zweite Teil präsentiert und analysiert die Ergebnisse 
einer dDänischen Untersuchung über EBR. Die Ergebnisse verdanken sich einer Befragung 
von dDänischen EBR-Mitgliedern und Managern in dDänischen MNU. Es zeigt sich, dass 
das Niveau des Arbeitnehmereinflusses durch EBR relativ niedrig ist. Im Bemühen, dies zu 
erklären, werden eine Reihe von Faktoren identifiziert, die Formulierung und Artikulierung 
von Arbeitnehmerinteressen auf supranationaler Ebene behindern. In der Konklusion wer-
den die Ergebnisse resümiert und auf ihre Bedeutung für die Institution der EBR diskutiert.   
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1.  The European Works Councils Directive  
After two decades of discussion and several failed initiatives, the European Works 
Council (EWC) Directive, adopted by the European Union in 1994, represented a 
landmark regarding information and consultation of employees in multinational com-
panies. 
This piece of regulation was justified in general by the promise made by Euro-
pean policy-makers of adding a social dimension to the European single market – a 
project that had been adopted in 1987 in spite of considerable sckepticism within the 
European labour movement (Knudsen 1995). While the directive was presented as a 
concession to demands from the labour movement, the European Commission also 
stressed that it could help to build a new balance in the single market: It was argued 
that without structures for transnational information and consultation employees in 
one country “affected by decisions taken elsewhere by the parent undertaking…could 
be unequally treated” which “is bound to have a direct effect on the operation of the 
internal market” (CEC 1990). Confronted by strong opposition from employer or-
ganizations and individual multinational companies (MNCs), the Commission further 
argued that the dialogue between EWCs and managements would be likely to promote 
worker involvement and commitment and thus productivity (quoted by Kolven-
bach/Hanau 1987-). 
The directive on European Works Councils applies to companies or groups of 
companies with more than 1000 employees (and at least 150 employees in two differ-
ent countries) within the European Economic Area (EEA = the 15 EU member states 
+ Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein). Such multinational companies, no matter 
whether they are based in EEA countries or outside (in for instance the US or Japan), 
are obliged to set up an EWC if requested to do so by the employee representatives. 
The EWC may be an employee-only body or a joint body for management and em-
ployee representatives.1  It is entitled to be informed and consulted by the central 
management on strategic issues as well as employment issues in so far as these involve 
employees in more than one country; typically therefore for example restructuring 
involving the relocation of jobs have to be taken up with the EWC. 
The normal procedure for instituting an EWC is an agreement based on prior ne-
gotiations between employee representatives and the central management of the com-
pany. Such a procedure is in line with the increasing influence of the subsidiarity prin-
ciple on EU social regulation (Schiller 1998). However, although flexible and open to 
national as well as company-specific interpretation, the directive does include elements 
of ‘hard’ regulation, i.e. statutory obligations to be respected by management. Thus, if 
management refuses to negotiate, or if negotiations do not result in an agreement 
                                                          
1  In this article the concept EWC either denotes an employee-only body or the employee 
side of a joint body. The rights granted in the EWC directive are in any event given to 
employee representatives. In practice, there may be little difference between an employee-
only body entitled to meet with management, and the employee side of a joint body, as 
most EWC agreements allow the employee side to have their own meetings besides the 
joint meetings with management. 
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within three years, the company is still obliged to finance the operations of an EWC 
and to meet with it at least once a year. This is spelt out by the so-called subsidiary 
requirements of the directive; they apply directly in situations where management 
refuses to conclude an agreement or where the negotiating parties fail to reach an 
agreement. 
The directive entered into force in the member states in 1996. By 2002 more than 
600 EWCs were in existence (Kerckhofs 2002, based on the database of the European 
Trade Union Institute2). With on average 18 employee representatives on each EWC 
(Marginson 1999) this amounted to 10,800 employee representatives with tasks at the 
transnational level. Generally, it is the larger MNCs rather than the smaller ones that 
have established EWCs. This is mainly due to the fact that trade union efforts have 
mainly targeted the larger companies (although trade unions are not mentioned in the 
directive, in reality they play a decisive role by urging employee representatives to 
initiate negotiations with management). It is not likely that all MNCs covered by the 
directive – estimated at 1865 by Kerkhofs (2002) – will establish EWCs, as in some 
cases neither employee representatives nor management take any initiative. Still, dur-
ing the next few years the number of European representatives will probably increase 
to about 20,000, so at least numerically this new body in European industrial relations 
is certainly not insignificant. 
2.  Perspectives and research on European Works Councils 
Already at an early stage, observers of the birth of the European Works Council 
tended to be divided into ‘Euro-pessimists’ and ‘Euro-optimists’ (Dølvik 1997). This 
division is to a large extent related to the application of different frames of reference. 
The pessimists tend to perceive EWCs as part of a pattern of a weak and incomplete 
European regulation compared to more labour-friendly regulation found in some of 
the member states. Streeck (1997) judging from a critical German perspective thus 
dramatically claimed EWCs to be neither works councils nor European. Further he 
argued that because of their weak foundation, EWCs may actually – through the 
mechanism of regime competition – help to undermine national representation sys-
tems and rights. Contrary to this, British observers have been more prone to compare 
with British institutions, and in that perspective even modest European regulations 
have given rise to optimism (see for instance Wills (2000) for a list of ‘great expecta-
tions’).  
Divergent views not only appear as optimism or pessimism based on more or less 
explicit comparisons with existing national institutions and discourses. Observers also 
diverge as to how much they expect EWCs to achieve in terms of efficient and solida-
ristic interest representation. Some seem to expect from them nothing less than genu-
ine international worker solidarity – certainly a high expectation in as much as consis-
tent worker solidarity across different workplaces is hardly the norm even in the best 
organized national systems. Others display more modest expectations, such as that 
                                                          
2  From my research on Nordic and in particular Danish based EWCs it is my experience 
that the list of EWC agreements registered by the ETUI database is incomplete. Thus, the 
number of EWCs calculated by Kerckhofs (2002) is most likely underestimated. 
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EWCs should be able to organize a dialogue –  with management and internally be-
tween employee representatives – which may be advantageous to all parties involved. 
High expectations tend to lead to pessimist research results as exemplified by 
these concluding remarks from a case study (Wills 2000: 103): 
“The EWC studied indicates that, as yet, these new European structures for international 
trade unionism have not facilitated widespread collective action, mass protest or even an 
embryonic collective consciousness at this level”. 
Instead of the bi-polar pessimist or optimist positions a more open-ended and search-
ing approach has been advocated by a number of researchers (for instance Hyman 
2000; Beaupain et alet al. 2001; Knudsen/Bruun 1998; Lecher et alet al. 1999; Margin-
son 2000). Here it is stressed that new opportunities have appeared with the EWC 
directive; and it still remains to be seen how these opportunities are seized and ex-
ploited by various groups of social actors. 
Over the last decade research on EWCs has moved from dealing with the expecta-
tions arising from the formal rules of the directive (e.g. Knutsen 1997; Streeck 1997), or 
the formal texts of EWC agreements (Marginson et al. 1998; Marginson 1999), to focus-
sing on the actual functioning and practice of EWCs. In particular, since 1999 a large 
number of articles and a few books have reported on the latter. Most of the studies have 
been case studies (e.g. Hancké 2000; Lecher et al. 1999; Lucio/Weston 2000; Whittall 
2000; Wills 2000), but a few studies based on surveys/questionnaires have also been 
conducted (Miller 1999; Nakano 1999; Veersma 1999). A comprehensive review of the 
EWC research literature has been elaborated by Müller/Hoffmann (2001). 
In an attempt to sum up the major research findings on the functioning of EWCs 
Beldam and Knudsen (2001) compared these findings with the original expectations 
attached to the EWC directive by the main social actors involved. In brief, it was 
found that employer expectations of a number of harmful effects of EWCs had not 
been confirmed; on the contrary, many MNCs seem to exploit its contact with the 
EWC as a useful management instrument. There was also evidence tending to sub-
stantiate the expectation of EU policy-makers, namely that the establishment of 
EWCs could lead to more harmonious industrial relations in MNCs. However, there 
was no strong evidence that could support the trade union expectation of EWCs as 
instruments for increased influence to employee representatives on corporate deci-
sions in MNCs. On this issue, which is the specific theme of this article, most research 
findings indicate a low degree of influence and point at weak and fragmentary struc-
tures for interest representation in the EWCs (see for instance Lecher et alet al. 1999; 
Hancké 2000). 
One of the few studies that has attempted to systematically measure the degree of 
EWC influence – understood as the EWC´s impact on corporate management deci-
sions – was a case study in eight UK- and US-based MNCs (Marginson et alet al. 
2001). This study found that in six of the companies the EWC had to a certain extent 
had an impact on the process of decision-making, in four cases the EWC had influenced 
the implementation of management decisions, but only in one case had the EWC had an 
impact on the substance of decisions. Among the achievements of this latter EWC was 
the conclusion of an agreement aimed at regulating the terms of employment during a 
phase of restructuring (Marginson et alet al. 2001). 
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A similar conclusion was drawn at the EU sponsored conference in Aarhus in 
November 2002, which brought 350 EWC representatives together. The evidence 
suggested that while many EWCs function in a way that falls below the standards of 
the directive only a small minority has reached a position where they are able to influ-
ence the decisions of corporate management (Knudsen 2003).  
Before the presentation of my own empirical findings the next section will go 
deeper into the question of EWC based employee influence by discussing theoretically 
the concept of employee influence at the supranational level. 
3.  The specifics of supranational employee influence 
The EWC directive is not a strong statutory base for employee influence, as it con-
tains no provisions granting employee representatives the right to negotiate with man-
agement or to take decisions jointly with management (co-determination). Formally, 
opportunities for influence exclusively rests on the obligation of the central manage-
ment to inform and consult the employee representatives on the EWC on a range of 
issues. The representatives may exploit the information given as a source for con-
structing a more precise picture of the company and its strategy and plans, and this 
may lead to the formulation of more adequate responses to management’s plans. Con-
sultation and dialogue with management may lead to influence in the sense that man-
agement takes proposals and ideas put forward be employee representatives into ac-
count and modify management decisions accordingly. In cases where both sides are 
interested, consultations may develop into informal negotiations and the conclusion of 
informal or formal agreements (examples of this are given by Hermann/Jacobi 2000). 
Thus, information and consultation processes provide opportunities for employee influ-
ence. However, whether these opportunities are exploited and leads to real influence 
depends very much on the good will of management as well as the activity of the em-
ployee representatives. 
Influence on decision-making may be defined as the achievement of certain out-
comes or effects which would not have been achieved without an effort to intervene 
in the decision-making process; at the same time the outcomes achieved must be 
deemed favorable or advantageous by the influence-seeking person or group. Influ-
ence for the employee side may be achieved at the expense of management interests 
or in a setting where both parties are able to gain from the particular decision. 
Whereas the former, adversarial, type of influence is typically connected to collective 
bargaining, the latter, co-operative, type is more likely to occur in structures geared to 
participation and cooperation (Crouch 1993; Knudsen 1995). 
Because of the multi-plant and multi-national character of the EWC, it is relevant 
to distinguish between influence gained by the EWC as a collective actor (or perhaps 
by the EWC’s chairman or select committee acting on behalf of all representatives) on 
the one hand, and influence gained by individual EWC representatives on the other. 
The crucial point here is whether employee interests are represented in a parochial and 
fragmentary way by the individual representatives or whether the EWC has managed 
to develop a common identity where interests are aggregated at the supranational 
level. In the latter instance, the influence achieved expresses international solidarity 
between the workforces represented on the EWC. In the former instance, the pursuit 
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of influence may also be an expression of international solidarity, spontaneously so to 
speak. However, if employee representatives see themselves as representing only their 
own, local constituency and interpret interest representation in a parochial way, they 
may pursue influence in competition with and possibly at the expense of other work-
forces within the MNC. Thus, Hancké (2000: 55) concludes from his case studies of 
EWCs in the car industry that: 
“Not only are EWCs relatively unimportant in building up international union strength; 
local trade unionists seem to use the EWCs to do the opposite: to obtain information that 
can be used in the competition for production capacity with other plants in the same 
company”. 
In this example the influence gained through the EWC by the representative from one 
plant actually seems to result in negative influence for the totality of workforces repre-
sented on the EWC. Hancké explains in some detail how management exploits the 
competition between workforces through rounds of concession bargaining in which 
concessions given by workers in one plant (for example on working time flexibility) 
become arguments for management when negotiations are started in the next plant.  
Inter-plant competition of this kind may of course be promoted and exploited by 
management irrespective of the existence of an EWC, but to the extent that Hancké’s 
observations hold true, the EWC may actually help to strengthen rather than weaken 
this oppressive mechanism. 
The task of securing that locally based interest representation develops into forms 
which are not just effective in the local context, but also coordinated with the collec-
tive interests of all workforces within the particular MNC, is no doubt the biggest 
challenge EWCs are confronted with. It is so to speak the moment of truth for inter-
national solidarity. 
One particular type of parochial pursuit of influence that has been discussed by 
several observers, is ‘alliances’ between corporate management and employee repre-
sentatives from the parent company or generally from the home country of the MNC 
(Elvander/Elvander 1995; Knudsen/Bruun 1998; Lecher et alet al. 1999). Lecher et 
alet al. (1999: 222-23) describe the ‘home advantage’ in this way: 
“As a rule, EWC representatives from the home country form the single largest contin-
gent – a dominant position which endows a feeling of security. They also usually have re-
course to national structures of representation to obtain information and influence on 
group-level decisions.” 
Elvander/Elvander (1995) describe a situation where Volvo had to cut down produc-
tion. Through local initiatives the influential employee representatives at the main 
plant in Gothenburg managed to obtain a promise from management that no jobs 
would be lost there. Instead job losses were ‘passed on’ to the Uddevalla factory lo-
cated elsewhere in Sweden and to a foreign subsidiary. Although these events took 
place before the establishment of an EWC at Volvo, the example demonstrates a type 
of practice that can easily continue, in spite of the existence of an EWC and with the 
risk of creating internal divisions within it. 
From the examples and arguments above it follows that the road to employee in-
fluence at the supranational level is closely connected with the process of constituting 
and maintaining the EWC as a collective actor. This process requires continuous 
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communication, supranational interest aggregation and the development of a common 
perspective among the EWC representatives. It also requires representatives to share 
the belief that solidarity can be extended to the supranational level, even if language 
and cultural barriers make this a much more demanding project than the achievement 
of solidarity at local or national level. 
After this discussion of the concept of employee influence and the specifics of 
supranational employee influence I will now move to the empirical findings and a 
discussion of these. 
4.  Supranational employee influence – as experienced by Danish actors 
4.1 Data and methodology 
Data on practices and attitudes of EWC representatives and managers involved with 
EWCs were collected by a colleague (Ole Ravnholt Sørensen) and myself. The aim of 
the study was to provide broad knowledge on how EWCs function and are experi-
enced by Danish EWC representatives as well as by managers of Danish MNCs; a 
more specific aim was to assess the training needs of EWC representatives. Survey 
data were collected during the summer and autumn of 1999 via a questionnaire sent to 
all Danish EWC employee representatives (111 of whom 85 responded). Another 
questionnaire was sent to top managers in the 27 Danish based MNCs that at that 
time had established an EWC; here 17 responded. The general findings of the study 
were reported by Knudsen and Sørensen (2000). In this article only selected data re-
lated to the issue of employee influence are analyzed.  
In the following sections the relevant parts of the comprehensive empirical mate-
rial collected for the study will be analyzed specifically with regard to the following 
two themes: 
 the extent and degree of influence achieved by EWCs 
 obstacles and barriers to supranational employee influence as evidenced by the 
research.   
Due to the low population, the data from the employer survey has not been broken 
down into any sub-categories. However, it may be mentioned that 13 of the 17 re-
spondents came from manufacturing industry. As to the survey among employee rep-
resentatives – which provide the  input to the analyses of obstacles and barriers pre-
sented below – data were broken down into a number of structural as well as actor 
variables. The structural variables were company size (measured by size of employ-
ment), sector, and country of origin of the MNCs in which respondents served as 
EWC representatives. The actor variables were: 
 seniority as EWC representative (< one year, 1-3 years, > three years) 
 position on EWC (lay members versus ‘office holders’ such as chairmen and vice-
chairmen or members of select committee) 
 extent of face to face communication between EWC members (representatives 
who had taken part in an arrangement with the aim that representatives of the 
EWC learn to know each other, versus representatives who had not). 
Due to the small size of the relevant sub-populations, no attempt has been made to 
apply advanced statistical methods to the analyses of data. In the presentation below 
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responses are reported either as absolute figures (the employer survey) or as relative 
figures (the employee side survey). Tables primarily report the responses of the total 
population; the structural and actor variables are only included in so far as responses 
from the various sub-groups differ substantially. 
4.2 Danish EWC representatives – a brief profile 
Among the 85 responding employee representatives 29 per cent were women. All but 
one were members of a trade union – 86 per cent were members of trade unions af-
filiated to the LO3 –, while the rest belonged to unions organizing for example engi-
neers, salespeople, trilingual secretaries, and foremen. At least three out of four served 
as local trade union delegates (shop stewards) and also held seats on local cooperation 
committees.4  30 per cent were joint shop stewards, 35 per cent member of a group 
cooperation committee in Denmark, and 42 per cent held a position as employee 
elected representative on the company board. Thus, generally the EWC representa-
tives elected were among the most experienced local trade union delegates. 
The distribution of the 85 EWC representatives in terms of the variables men-
tioned above was as follows: 
 Country of origin of MNC/EWC: 47 per cent served on EWCs in Danish based 
MNCs, while 53 per cent were seated as Danish representatives on EWCs be-
longing to MNCs based in other countries, notably Swedish, British, Swiss and 
German based groups. 
 Size: 32 per cent were employed in MNCs with more than 20,000 employees 
while 68 per cent were in smaller MNCs. 
 Sector: 41 per cent came from EWCs in manufacturing industry, 15 per cent from 
construction, 13 percent from drink, food and tobacco, and 11 per cent from 
pharmaceutical and chemical industries.  
 Office holders versus lay members: 13 per cent of the representatives held a position as 
president or vice-president of the EWC, and 22 per cent were member of the 
EWC’s executive committee or steering group; 71 per cent were lay members. 
 Seniority: 17 per cent had less than one year of seniority, 48 per cent had between 
one and three years, and 35 per cent had served on the EWC for more than three 
years. 
 Extent of communication: 50 per cent had taken part in a ‘get together’ with their 
EWC colleagues, 50 per cent had not.  
4.3 Extent and degree of employee influence 
In the employer survey managers were asked what issues had been treated at meetings 
between the EWC and management and to what extent and degree the EWC had had 
an impact on corporate management decisions. The results are shown in table 1. 
                                                          
3  Landsorganisationen i Danmark: the by far largest trade union confederation in the coun-
try, representing mainly workers. 
4  Cooperative committees are the Danish equivalent for works councils. 
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Table 1:  Issues treated at meetings between EWCs and management, and impact of 
EWC on corporate management decisions  – as assessed by management 
representatives (n = 16) 
 Treated at 
Meetings 
No im-
pact 
Small 
impact 
Some 
Impact 
Great 
impact 
Corporate strategy 
Corporate structure 
Investments 
EWC budget & resources 
Personnel policy 
Training 
Health and safety 
Transfer of jobs 
Closure of plants 
Job losses 
Opening of plants 
Out-sourcing 
Employment security 
Pay policy 
Recognition of unions 
16 
15 
10 
2 
9 
8 
5 
8 
9 
8 
10 
5 
4 
- 
2 
14 
15 
14 
14 
12 
12 
13 
11 
12 
11 
16 
14 
14 
16 
16 
- 
1 
2 
1 
3 
2 
2 
5 
4 
4 
- 
1 
1 
- 
- 
2 
- 
- 
- 
1 
1 
1 
- 
- 
1 
- 
1 
1 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
Table 1 demonstrates that issues mentioned by the directive such as corporate strat-
egy, structure, investments and aspects associated with restructuring appear relatively 
frequent on the agenda. However, other issues, notably personnel policy, training, and 
health and safety are also treated. As to the extent and degree of influence of EWCs – 
as measured as impact on management decisions – it appears that in most Danish 
based multinationals EWCs have not had any substantial influence, according to the 
management representatives. To complete this picture it must be added that those 
managers reporting some sort of EWC impact on management decisions were clus-
tered within one half of the population whereas the respondents representing the 
other half reported ‘no impact’ on all the issues mentioned. This indicates substantial 
variations in the way EWCs are functioning in relation to corporate decision-making. 
The fact that half of the managers reported no impact whatsoever may also be in-
terpreted as an expression of a distinct bias on the part of some of the management 
respondents. European as well as national employer organisations were very much 
opposed to the EWC directive, which was perceived as a constraint to management 
prerogatives (Knudsen 1995). Although employer organisations have now given up 
their resistance and instead are advocating a pragmatic adaptation to the terms of the 
directive there is still a great awareness of management prerogatives. According to 
employer organisations, EWCs should not develop into anything else than fora for 
information and consultation. Hence, managers admitting that the EWC has an im-
pact on management decisions are in fact expressing a deviant view contradicting the 
line defined by employer organisations. For this reason, the influence of EWCs on 
management decisions may be somewhat higher than reported by the managers. 
This indicated bias appears clearer if we compare the responses given by em-
ployer and employee representatives respectively to the question whether any agree-
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ments had been concluded between the EWC and management. To conclude an 
agreement is obviously to go beyond mere information and consultation and a clear 
sign that some element of influence has been conceded to the EWC. Among the 
management representatives everyone replied that no agreements concerning labour 
and employment conditions had been concluded. On the employee side, however, 17 
per cent (13 respondents) reported that one or more agreements had been concluded. 
Some of these agreements may be disregarded as they dealt with the functioning of 
the EWC itself and may thus be seen as following up on the agreement that intro-
duced the EWC in the group. But other agreements dealt with various aspects of la-
bour and employment conditions; among the issues mentioned were: transfer of pro-
duction, closures and openings of plants, bonus payment, employment security, social 
responsibility, and training.  
This evidence from the employee side leads to two considerations concerning the 
extent of EWC influence. First, that it may be a bit higher than indicated by table 1, 
and, second, that the two sides seem to interpret the outcomes of discussions at 
EWC-management meetings differently. While managers may admit that consultations 
have had a certain impact on management decisions, employee representatives may 
tend to interpret positive outcomes as a sign that a traditional road to influence, nego-
tiations leading to agreements, has been applied. 
The main conclusion, however, at this stage is that most EWCs have not 
achieved any influence on corporate management decisions; this finding is in line with 
the findings of other studies presented earlier. On the basis of evidence from the Dan-
ish survey among employee representatives the rest of this article will discuss why the 
influence is limited. I must stress here that the data from the two surveys do not sup-
ply any ‘hard’ evidence able to unveil the reasons for the relatively low degree of influ-
ence. Rather, we have to do with indicators that give relevant information and are 
suitable for formulating some hypotheses or tentative explanations, which will have to 
be investigated in further research.  
4.4 Obstacles to EWC influence 
An easy answer to explain the lack of influence of EWCs would be that the directive 
and the agreements implementing the directive at company level do not provide an 
adequate instrument for influence. However, this does not correspond with the views 
held by EWC representatives, cf. tables 2 and 3. 
Table 2: “The EWC directive provides a good framework for cooperation with the 
group management” (per cent) 
 Fully  
agree 
Partly 
agree 
Partly 
disagree 
Fully  
disagree 
Don’t  
know 
N 
All reps. 10 48 25 3 14 84 
 
Table 3: “Our EWC agreement provides a good framework for cooperation with the 
group management” (per cent) 
 Fully  
agree 
Partly 
agree 
Partly 
disagree 
Fully  
disagree 
Don’t  
know 
N 
All reps. 27 58 8 3 4 84 
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Although other questions revealed the majority of EWC representatives would like 
improvements to the directive as well as the company-specific agreement, not least in 
terms of stronger formal rights to influence, tables 2 and 3 show that neither directive 
nor agreements are seen as serious obstacles to cooperation with management. It may 
be objected that ‘cooperation’ does not equal ‘influence’; however, in Danish indus-
trial relations language cooperation between employees and management does imply a 
certain degree of influence sharing. 
Another obvious reason for the lack of influence could be management resis-
tance. Yet, table 4 indicates that most representatives do not perceive management as 
a serious obstacle to employee influence. In particular this is the case in Danish based 
MNCs and smaller MNCs. 
Table 4: “Group management takes the proposals and ideas we put forward into ac-
count” (per cent) 
 Fully 
agree 
Partly 
agree 
Partly 
disagree 
Fully 
disagree 
Don’t 
know 
N 
All reps. 27 41 16 7 9 81 
Reps. in Danish 
based MNCs 
38 38 16 3 5 37 
Reps. in MNCs 
based abroad 
19 47 16 9 9 43 
MNCs < 20,000 
Employees 
39 48 4 - 9 52 
MNCs >20,000 
Employees 
21 39 22 11 7 25 
 
Similarly, most respondents were satisfied with the resources made available by man-
agement for their EWC related activities; for instance only 11 per cent found that they 
were not given sufficient paid time off. 
The results presented in table 4 suggest that a clear majority of EWC representa-
tives see a potential for achieving influence through the EWC. Hence, the next ques-
tion is: Why has this potential not been realized in a majority of EWCs? 
In the first instance an explanation may be sought in the activity level and motiva-
tion of the EWC representatives themselves. Tables 5-7 provide some data on this. 
Table 5:  “How often are you in contact with your EWC colleagues (via telephone, fax, 
mail, letter or meeting)?” (per cent) 
 >< once 
per week 
App. once 
per week 
App. once 
per month 
Only at 
Meetings 
N 
All reps. 7 13 45 35 83 
Office holders 10 31 59 - 28 
Reps with>3 
years seniority 
7 20 40 33 30 
 
From table 5 it appears that one third of EWC representatives are only in contact with 
the colleagues on their EWC at meetings. This typically means once per year as the 
vast majority of EWC agreements stipulate one yearly meeting where the EWC meets 
214  Herman Knudsen: European Works Councils 
internally as well as with management. At the other extreme only one out of five rep-
resentatives are in contact with EWC colleagues on a weekly or more frequent basis, 
although the contact frequency is clearly higher among those who hold a chair such as 
chairman, vice-chairman or member of the EWC’s select committee. The table also 
demonstrates that contact frequency does not increase substantially with seniority on 
the EWC. These findings indicate internal communication to be so weakly developed 
in many EWCs that a coherent attempt to aggregate interests and seek influence on 
corporate decisions can hardly take place. 
Table 6: “The employee side (the EWC) has not done enough to achieve influence” 
(per cent) 
 Fully 
agree 
Partly 
agree 
Partly 
disagree 
Fully 
disagree 
Don’t 
know 
N 
All reps. 17 42 23 16 3 80 
Reps with >3 
years seniority 
25 46 18 7 4 28 
Reps in MNCs 
based abroad 
12 38 33 17 - 43 
  
As shown in table 6, more than half of the respondents agreed that the EWC has not 
done enough to achieve influence, and among those who had served for more than 
three years on the EWC as many as 71 per cent did so. This is remarkable because it 
indicates that the lack of influence of EWCs is not due to the mere novelty of the 
EWC institution, but seems to have deeper and more persistent causes. Representa-
tives in MNCs based abroad were less prone to agree with the statement. This may be 
interpreted as owing to the fact that for them the EWC provides the only access to 
group management – contrary to the representatives in Danish based MNCs who may 
also exploit the national participation structures (representation on company board 
and central works council). 
Table 7: “EWC work plays a very small role compared to shop steward work in Den-
mark” (per cent) 
 Fully agree Partly 
agree 
Partly 
disagree 
Fully dis-
agree 
Don’t know N 
All reps. 18 43 21 16 2 84 
 
Table 7 attempts to measure the relative importance attached to EWC activities by the 
representatives compared to trade union activities at the local level. Although the re-
plies answers are quite divided a clear majority perceive the role of the EWC as less 
important than the role as a representative at local level. 
At this stage, it is obviously relevant to ask: How are the representatives moti-
vated with respect to EWC activities? Apparently, they are only weakly motivated by 
their constituency, for two out of three representatives agreed that ‘most colleagues 
show no interest in the work of the EWC’, and four out of five agreed that it is ‘diffi-
cult for the colleagues to understand what goes on in the EWC’. Contrary to this, the 
vast majority felt that they get good support from other local trade union delegates; 
four out of five agreed that ‘my shop steward colleagues see the work of the EWC as 
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an important part of trade union work’. As to support from national trade union or-
ganisations the opinions were divided. A majority of the representatives found they 
got the support they need. However, there was also a majority in favour of the propo-
sition that the national unions should put more resources into supporting the EWCs. 
In particular, this majority wanted the unions to supply more information about the 
nature of tasks to be solved by EWCs, to help make the EWCs more visible, and to 
arrange training for people interested in being elected to an EWC.  
Unfortunately, the survey did not cover the theme of political guidance from the 
trade unions. However, from the literature it is well known that trade unions across 
Europe have diverging views on what role the EWCs should play (Lecher et alet al. 
1999; Müller/Hoffmann 2001). In Denmark as well as other countries unions have 
expressed fear that EWCs may develop into agents for collective bargaining and thus 
threaten the strong role of unions in national bargaining structures. Due to this, in 
some respects trade unions have tended to constrain rather than promote the role of 
EWCs in industrial relations – as described succinctly by a trade union officer respon-
sible for servicing EWCs (Odgaard 2000): 
“When on rare occasions we have taken an interest in the activities and tasks of the 
EWCs, the starting point has been to contain the activities of the EWCs. We have been 
good at telling what the EWCs shall not deal with, and we have been bad at telling them 
what they shall deal with. We have never attempted to draw up a proper trade union 
strategy defining the tasks and issues that EWCs must try to promote” (my own transla-
tion, HK). 
It seems that EWCs here almost take on the role of the ugly duckling as described in 
the fairytale by Hans Christian Andersen! Logically, we also here have a good explana-
tion for the relative passivity of Danish EWC representatives and the low priority 
most of them attach to EWC activities. For as already mentioned the vast majority of 
EWC representatives are experienced trade union delegates – people who are used to 
rely on the political guidelines given by their unions as a major point of orientation. 
When the signal from the union is ‘stop’ rather than ‘go’ they are certainly not rein-
forced to go for supranational influence through the EWC. 
Until now the search for explanations of the relative lack of employee influence 
through EWCs has only dealt with explanatory factors at the national level. It has 
been established that on the surface low influence may be explained by low activity 
among EWC representatives and  the relative low priority given to EWC activities. 
Further, it has been argued that on a deeper level lack of interest among the colleagues 
at the workplace and constraining signals from national trade unions are likely to play 
a de-motivating role. What have not been treated are the specific problems arising 
from the fact that the EWC is a multi-national body. The next section attempts to 
remedy this. 
4.5 Obstacles due to multi-nationality  
In the employee side survey a number of questions addressed the fact that EWCs are 
multi-national, multi-lingual and multi-cultural bodies of interest representation. Inter-
est aggregation is complicated not just by the existence of a multitude of plants, but 
also by the multitude of countries these plants are located in. On most EWCs many 
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different native tongues are represented, and although most EWC agreements provide 
for translation between the relevant languages, language differences cannot but act as 
a barrier on efficient communication among EWC representatives. And even if lan-
guage barriers are overcome, ‘cultural’ barriers remain. The European countries cov-
ered by the EWC directive have vastly different industrial relations systems and par-
ticipation structures. Not just formal rules differ, so do formal and informal practices, 
for instance regarding meetings between managers and employee representatives (see 
for instance Hyman/Ferner 1998; Knudsen 1995; Lecher et alet al. 1999). 
As shown in table 8 only a minority saw differences in interests among employees 
as a serious obstacle. However, it is noteworthy that a majority of those who are most 
engaged in EWC work, ‘office holders’, agreed that such differences do create prob-
lems for the formation of agreement within the EWC. Still, very few ‘fully agreed’, so 
a plausible interpretation is that many see diverging interests as a problem, yet as a 
problem that can be overcome. 
Table 8: “We have difficulties in agreeing because we have different interests” (per 
cent) 
 Fully  
agree 
Partly 
agree 
Partly 
disagree 
Fully  
disagree 
Don’t  
know 
N 
All reps. 4 34 37 20 6 81 
Office hold-
ers 
7 63 17 13 - 23 
 
Another question attempted to test whether the problem of alliances between repre-
sentatives from the home country of the MNC and group management was seen as a 
widespread phenomenon. The results displayed in table 9 indicate that less than a 
third see a problem in this respect. Responses from representatives in Danish based 
versus EWCs based abroad did not vary substantially. This finding does not disqualify 
findings from other research identifying alliances between employees and manage-
ment from the home country of the MNC. However, it does tell us that most EWC 
representatives do not see such possible alliances as a problem for the cooperation in 
the EWC.  
Table 9: “The employees in the home country of the group run their own show to-
gether with the group management” (per cent) 
 Fully  
agree 
Partly 
agree 
Partly 
disagree 
Fully  
disagree 
Don’t  
know 
N 
All reps. 4 25 24 37 10 80 
 
Being aware that language and cultural differences are obstacles to the cooperation 
among EWC representatives we deliberately chose to formulate strong statements 
concerning the significance of these factors  – by asking whether they make ‘effective 
cooperation impossible’. The answers are shown in tables 10 and 11. Here the commu-
nication variable is also included. As mentioned earlier the ‘high communication’ 
group is defined as those who had had the opportunity to be together with their EWC 
colleagues at a special arrangement with the aim of learning to know each other, 
whereas the ‘low communication’ group are those who had not had this opportunity. 
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It appears that close to half of the respondents view language problems and cul-
tural differences as serious obstacles to an effective cooperation among the EWC 
representatives. However, it is also shown that the extent of communication within 
the individual EWC has a distinct impact on the degree to which these factors are seen 
as barriers to cooperation. In addition, regarding language a strong correlation was 
found between language skills – as assessed by the respondents themselves – and 
views held on language as a barrier to cooperation. Among those with ‘sufficient lan-
guage skills’ 65 per cent disagreed that ‘language difficulties make effective coopera-
tion impossible’, whereas among those with ‘insufficient’ skills only 31 per cent did so. 
Table 10: “Language difficulties make effective cooperation impossible” (per cent) 
 Fully  
agree 
Partly 
agree 
Partly 
disagree 
Fully  
disagree 
Don’t  
know 
N 
All reps. 17 30 32 16 5 81 
High 
comm. 
10 29 40 17 4 42 
Low comm. 26 31 23 15 5 39 
 
Table 11:  “Differences in ways of thinking/culture make effective cooperation impos-
sible” (per cent) 
 Fully  
agree 
Partly 
agree 
Partly 
disagree 
Fully  
disagree 
Don’t  
know 
N 
All reps. 6 36 32 22 4 80 
High 
comm. 
7 29 31 31 2 41 
Low comm. 5 44 33 13 5 39 
  
To conclude: A substantial part proportion of EWC representatives do experience the 
features connected with the multi-national character of EWCs as barriers to a smooth 
cooperation within the EWC. Differences in interests, language and culture are seen as 
obstacles to interest representation at the supranational level, and as such the may be 
added to the factors helping to explain the relatively low level of influence on corpo-
rate decisions. Yet, they are not given facts that cannot be changed. The findings sug-
gest that through training and intensified communication their impact can be dimin-
ished considerably. 
5.  Conclusions 
European Works Councils have been heralded as bodies that may grant employees a 
certain influence on decision-making in multinational companies. Case studies have 
indicated that employee influence through the EWC is possible, but also that many 
EWCs have not achieved any noticeable degree of influence. This impression is sup-
ported by this study, based on surveys among Danish EWC representatives and Dan-
ish managers responsible for contacts with the EWC. Influence – on issues such as 
corporate strategy, restructuring involving transfer of jobs and relocation of plants, 
personnel policy, training etc. – is a reality, but only in a minority of those Danish 
multinationals that have instituted an EWC. 
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Having established this, the study went on searching for explanations of the rela-
tive absence of EWC based employee influence. It was found that factors such as 
employer resistance or the formal rules of the EWC directive and the company spe-
cific agreements were not considered major obstacles to employee influence. More 
convincing – although still tentative in character – explanations were found by study-
ing the actions and attitudes of the EWC representatives themselves. It appeared that 
most of them were relatively passive (in terms of communicating with each other); 
that they valued EWC activities as less important than local trade union activities; and 
that they felt they had not themselves done enough to achieve influence through the 
EWC. This seems to indicate that some de-motivating or discouraging factors are at 
play in their environment. 
Discouraging factors were indeed found – as well in the local and national as the 
supranational environment of the EWC representatives. At work the EWC represen-
tatives meet only little interest in EWC activities among the colleagues, although their 
shop steward colleagues do take an interest in EWC issues. From the national trade 
union federations to which they belong they get unclear signals as to what EWCs 
should try to achieve. And on the EWC itself they encounter difficulties in overcom-
ing barriers connected with language problems and differences in interests and cultural 
background. Yet, most representatives do not view ‘alliances’ between the representa-
tives from the home country of the MNC and corporate management as a major 
problem. 
The general conclusion of the study can be summed up briefly as follows: Low 
EWC influence is due to low effort, which again is triggered by a number of discour-
aging factors operating at local, national and supranational level. Discouragement 
seems to some extent to be structurally determined (company size, country of origin 
of MNC), but actor variables appear to have a stronger impact. In particular the den-
sity of communication within the EWC was found to  impact considerably on whether 
differences in language, culture and interests were seen as major obstacles to internal 
cooperation among the EWC representatives. Hence, there is no reason to interpret 
the conclusion as lending support to pessimist attitudes to EWCs. If trade unions at 
national and European level develop coherent strategies for how and on what issues 
EWCs should seek influence, and if communication and training within the individual 
EWCs are intensified, EWCs will be much more likely to achieve influence on corpo-
rate decisions than they are today. 
Can the results of this Danish study be generalized to non-Danish EWCs and 
EWC representatives? Not, in any strict sense. On the other hand, the findings con-
cerning the extent and degree of employee influence do not diverge greatly from case 
study findings covering mainly German, French, Italian and British EWC representa-
tives (Lecher et alet al. 1999; Marginson et alet al. 2001). However, perhaps the dis-
couraging factors discussed above are at play in a stronger way in Denmark/the Nor-
dic countries than in most other European countries. Danish workers and trade un-
ions are among the most skeptical towards the European Union and EU institutions 
(Knudsen/Lind 1999). In a recent survey among EWC representatives from six coun-
tries (Ireland, UK, Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and Finland) Waddington (2003) 
found the Nordic representatives to be the least enthusiastic regarding EWCs. An 
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explanation for this cannot be found in Waddington’s study; nor can it be found in 
this one. A plausible hypothesis could be that it is related to the relatively great influ-
ence of unions and their close cooperation with employers and employer organiza-
tions in the Nordic countries. To the extent that national participation structures are 
experienced as efficient, the need for interest aggregation and representation at the 
European level may be felt as less acute. 
Finally, a comment is needed on the fact that the study presented here is based 
on data collected in 1999. This means that the experiences and views expressed in the 
data reflect the early phase of EWCs. It is likely that the quantitative strength of the 
factors indicating obstacles to employee influence would be weaker if the survey were 
repeated today. Actually, in December 2003 I had the opportunity to repeat one of the 
1999 questions at a conference where 30 Danish EWC representatives were present. 
Now only three respondents (10 per cent) agreed with the statement that ‘Differences 
in ways of thinking/culture make effective cooperation impossible” as against 42 per 
cent in the 1999 survey, cf. table 11. Yet, while this may indicate a positive learning 
process where obstacles preventing EWCs from functioning as efficient social actors 
are overcome, there is no reason to doubt that these obstacles are still at work to a 
considerable extent. It is not so much the quantitative data on obstacles to employee 
influence that has borne the argument of this article; it is rather the qualitative mecha-
nisms illustrated by these data. So, I hope that the identification of mechanisms inhib-
iting EWC based employee influence at supranational level will prove fruitful for ac-
tion as well as further research on this question.  
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